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Home is where the heart lies? A study of false address giving to police 
 
‘A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes’ (Mark 
Twain).1 
 
 
Lying has been described as an essential part of everyday human social interaction, with 
research finding deception to be ‘a daily life event’ perpetrated by all of us (DePaulo et 
al., 1996; Vrij, 2008). Although seemingly infinite, reasons for lying generally fall into 
either those driven by selfish personal ambition, or those of more altruistic orientation 
such as sparing the feelings of others. One has only to think of a recent social interaction 
in order to recall a deceit of some kind. For example, when you complimented the host on 
his or her cooking ability when really you wished you had taken the trouble to eat before 
you arrived (or brought indigestion tablets). An example of lying and deception however 
it might masquerade as kindness, politeness or ‘the right thing to do’. Let’s face it, the 
social world would certainly run less smoothly and would quite probably collapse 
without them (Vrij, 2008). Evolutionary psychologists suggest the human ability to 
deceive is ‘hard-wired’ (Bond and Robinson, 1988) representing an adaptive strategy for 
survival and reproductive advantage (Premack and Woodruff, 1978, Whiten and Byrne, 
1997.). The reader should therefore take heart. We all tell lies. It is in our make-up. 
 
The question of why people lie has received no little attention and exploration of the full 
gambit of reasons is better provided elsewhere (e.g. Ekman, 2001; DePaulo and Morris, 
                                                 
1
 Found at http://www.twainquotes.com/Lies.html (accessed 12 May 2007) - This quote has been attributed 
to Mark Twain, but it has never been verified as originating with Twain. This quote may have originated 
with Charles Haddon Spurgeon (1834-92) who attributed it to an old proverb in a sermon delivered on 
Sunday morning, April 1, 1855. Spurgeon was a celebrated English fundamentalist Baptist preacher. His 
words were: "A lie will go round the world while truth is pulling its boots on." 
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2005; Vrij, 2008). This is of little direct importance here. Presumably, those who give 
false addresses to police lie to avoid some sanction or punishment, although to benefit 
another could also be reason. For example, to protect a partner, family member, friend or 
associate in some way (e.g. Mum couldn’t bear the shame of police officers visiting the 
family home). The focus of this paper is not why but how some people cognitively 
generate false addresses when stopped by police. Although their reasons for lying may 
vary the purpose of the lie remains the same (i.e. to deceive police).     
 
With regards the importance of detecting false detail givers per se, the findings of two 
studies covering the use of false and other people’s identities estimate that identity crime 
costs the UK economy between £1.3 and £1.7 billion per annum (Cabinet Office July 
2002, Home Office Identity Fraud Steering Group, 2006). Offenders use false personal 
details to commit what the UK Home Office refers to as, identity crime. The generic term 
comprise crimes of identity theft, creating a false identity and committing identity fraud.2 
Identity crime, in this instance, refers to the use of false or another’s details often to 
facilitate financial crime such as credit card or benefit fraud. As such, it does not as 
readily refer to its use as facilitator of other serious crime such as terrorism, whereby 
false identity is a means by which criminals go undetected (e.g. Salaheddine Benyaich 
and Dhiren Barot, BBC 2007)3. Unsurprisingly, due to a narrowness of interpretation, 
research on false identity crime as a ‘smoke-screen’ for more serious criminality is scant 
by comparison to financial related crime, despite growing research evidence which 
                                                 
2
 See for example  http://www.identity-theft.org.uk/faqs.html for a fuller explanation (accessed July 2007) 
3
  Salaheddine Benyaich had obtained a false UK passport and was later convicted of a bombing in 
Morocco. Dhiren Barot had also obtained a false UK passport and was sentenced to life for conspiracy to 
murder – he admitted to planning a major UK terrorist attack.).  BBC News, found at, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6470179.stm (accessed 16/07/07) 
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suggests those who give false details to police often do so to conceal serious concurrent 
offending (Roach 2007a; 2007b). By definition, it is not known what percentage of 
individuals stopped give false details to police, but a need to prioritise serious crime4 and 
a lack of available resources (e.g. time and personnel) are popular reasons mooted as to 
why false detail givers are often only half-heartedly pursued. In some instances they are 
not followed up at all (Roach, 2007b). It suffices to say here that there is a strong 
possibility that if increased effort is placed on tracing false detail givers (i.e. as a matter 
of routine) then more active serious offenders will be apprehended as a consequence. By 
giving false details, individuals ‘self-select’ for police scrutiny which is likely to uncover 
more serious criminality (Chenery et al.1999; Roach, 2007a, 2007b). This paper builds on 
this approach by focusing specifically on false address giving to police and the cognitive 
processes involved in the generation of a false address. Moreover, how knowledge of 
such cognitive processes can be used to identify and trace those who give a false address 
to police. 
 
There are of course significant differences between assuming a known identity and giving 
false details. The assumption of a known identity entails a degree of forward planning. 
For example, that sufficient corroborative information is known (or is suitably fabricated) 
which can give the authentication necessary, for say a bogus passport application.5  
Giving false details when stopped by police is arguably often a much less sophisticated, 
more spontaneous process, whereby ‘unprepared’ individuals have a minute period of 
time in which to fabricate plausible false information.  In such situations ‘top-down’ 
                                                 
4
 As  recommended in the Policing Green Paper 2008  found at 
http://files.homeoffice.gov.uk/police/policing_green_paper.pdf(accessed 12/11/2008) 
5
 For example, details of date and place of birth and knowledge of application procedures.,  
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cognitive processing (e.g. Eysenck and Keane, 1995) comes into play, where pre-existing 
knowledge schemas are relied on.  
 
There exists a distinct possibility that ‘seasoned’ criminals are more likely to have a false 
address prepared in advance to cover ‘occupational hazards’ such as being stopped by 
police. Although the writer considers this an important area for future research, it is not a 
primary concern of the present paper as a more general exploration of false detail 
generation is first necessary before attempting offender/non-offender comparison.. The 
objective here, therefore, is the identification of cognitive processes associated with the 
spontaneous generation of a false address. Namely, when false details are given with the 
aim of deception, to what extent does the deceiver unwittingly give clues as to their true 
place of residence? Consequently, if clues are indeed unintentionally given, what and 
how much effort is required to decipher them and what is the likelihood of tracing the 
putative offender?  
 
An overwhelming majority of the psychological research pertaining to lies and deceit in a 
forensic setting focuses on the search for tell-tale signs which give the deceiver away, 
particularly the non-verbal. Non-verbal communication, such as body language, has long 
been a preoccupation with psychologists (e.g. avoiding eye-contact, playing with hair) 
alongside tests of body function such as the polygraph test, seen as involuntary indicators 
of the strain of deception (see Verschuere et al., 2004 or Vrij, 2008 for excellent 
reviews). Some have focused specifically on the ability of ‘professional lie-catchers’, 
including police officers and security service personnel to detect lies. Although a small 
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enhanced ability has been found in comparison with student samples (e.g. Ekman & 
O’Sullivan, 1991; Porter, Woodworth and Birt, 2000; Hartwig, et al., 2004), the evidence 
suggests overwhelmingly that the majority of people are not very good at detecting 
deception. Accuracy levels have consistently been found to be between 45 and 60 per 
cent (Taylor and Hick, 2007; Vrij, 2008). Popular explanations offered for this relatively 
low accuracy include the existence of a time-lag between popularly held stereotypical 
cues for detecting liars (Taylor and Hick, 2007), such as ‘gaze avoidance’ (Vrij, 1995; 
Vrij and Mann, 2001). Moreover, what are often commonly believed to be non-verbal 
cues to deception might instead be considered to be outdated in the arms-race between 
those trying to deceive and those trying not to be (Taylor and Hick, 2007). Recent 
evidence suggests that an individual’s mood (i.e. emotional state) also affects the 
accuracy of their ability to detect deception (Forgas and East, 2008).  
 
Research has also focused on the identification of verbal characteristics of lying such as 
‘slow speech and frequent pausing’ (e.g. see Vrij, 2008) with much specifically directed 
at police-suspect interview situations (e.g. Gudjonsson, 2007). A review of the literature 
identifies several verbal criteria which appear fruitful in discriminating between deceit 
and truth, particularly when a liar has to instantly invent an answer. Deceptive statements 
might for example be short and factual (possibly unconvincing), negative (e.g. ‘I am not 
a criminal’) and impersonal (i.e. do not refer to themselves explicitly because they have 
not experienced what they claim to have) (Vrij, 2008). 
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Both verbal and non-verbal characteristics developed for unmasking liars lend themselves 
more readily to relatively time-rich police-suspect interview situations, than to 
identifying false detail givers on the street, often from only a few minutes interaction. 
They also offer little assistance to those later trying to trace false detail givers sometime 
after initial contact. The present paper, although irrefutably within the realm of lies and 
deceit in the forensic setting, is concerned with those who give a false address to police 
and not suspect-interviews as such. The aim here is not to discern how deception can be 
realised from non-verbal cues, or even from the manner in which things are verbalised. It 
is to explore whether what is said by the false detail giver can be used to identify the true 
place of residence being concealed.  
 
What is needed is a way of a) discerning those who give false details to police from those 
who are truthful at the point of contact, and b) identifying the real residence of those later 
found to have given false personal details. So how can cognitive psychology help police 
better detect false detail givers? 
 
A distinction is often made between processing which is stimulus driven (e.g. the 
processing by my eyes of letters on the computer screen) referred to as ‘bottom-up’ 
processing, and ‘top-down’ processing, which refers to processing affected by what the 
individual brings to a stimulus situation (e.g. my understanding of what those letters 
mean from the particular sequence they are in and a stored knowledge of the meanings of 
words). If one is to spontaneously fabricate a plausible false address then one needs an 
address schema (knowledge of how addresses are comprised, formatted etc). A complete 
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UK address should include a post code which comprises of a strict sequence of numbers 
and letters (e.g. EN8 9PT). This first denotes a wider postal district (e.g. EN8 identifies 
Waltham Cross, Hertfordshire) and second a street/road (e.g. 9QP identifies Green 
Lanes). To fabricate a full UK address necessitates, therefore, prior stored knowledge and 
demonstrates the necessity of top-down processing as guessing the format of a UK 
address and postcode perfectly, without prior experience, would be a formidable 
challenge.  
 
Cognitive neurobiological research on human deception (e.g. Spence, 2004) indicates that 
‘executive cognitive processes’ (such as memory and intuition) are heavily involved in 
the production of lies and deceit which makes them ‘effortful’ (Gambos, 2006). Studies 
have continually shown that humans tend to be ‘cognitive misers’ (Fiske and Taylor, 
2008) often relying on heuristics rather than carrying out extensive cognitive 
computations (e.g. Khaneman and Tversky 1972, 1973; Rossmo, 2009). 
 
Studies focussed on assessment criteria indicative of deception have reported that 
‘honest’ participants give longer, more detailed and more ‘candid’ (i.e. honest admissions 
of potential mistakes) than their ‘dishonest’ counterparts (Colwell et al., 2007). 
All things considered, it appears highly plausible that when generating a false address 
most individuals rely on stored knowledge (i.e. memory). As such, they provide clues as 
to the real address being concealed. 
 
The present study 
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To date, there has been no systematic study of the cognitive processes involved in false 
address generation. Although purely exploratory in nature, this paper seeks to identify the 
cognitive processing involved in generating a false address, exploring whether false 
givers generally default to top-down processing unwittingly given by the generation of a 
false address. We arrive at two hypotheses; 
H1 - a significant percentage of people will find it difficult to fabricate an entire 
false address when put on the spot, and as a consequence; 
H2 - a significant percentage will, to differing degrees, give false details via a top-
down process, which will provide clues as to their place of residence. 
If the hypotheses are supported then the identifying and tracing of putative offenders 
becomes a more realistic proposition for police and other agencies (e.g. Benefits Agency 
and Immigration Control).  
 
Method 
Sample descriptors 
A total of 142 students at a university in the North of England, took part in the study. 
Most were studying psychology and criminology at undergraduate level but some were 
postgraduates. Females represented 75% (n=107) and males 25% (n=35) reflecting 
opportunity based sampling. The mean age was 22 years, with a range of 18-55 years and 
a standard deviation of 6.26 years.  
 
Procedure 
All participants took part in the study simultaneously. The study was of one of quasi-
experimental, repeated measures design. Participants were not informed of the purpose of 
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the task in advance, simply that their participation would entail answering a few 
questions as part of ongoing research. The study was fully compliant with BPS guidelines 
and procedures. 
 
Participants were asked some demographic questions first (e.g. gender, age) before, 
second, given the brief scenario; 
Please imagine that you have been stopped by a police officer and asked to give 
your personal details. For some reason you do not wish to give your correct 
address. Please take no more than 10 seconds to think up a false address (this 
must include; house number, street, road etc. town, county and postcode). Please 
write this in the space below. 
 
Participants were next asked if they could identify the decision-making process which 
they believed had led them to construct their false address and to record this on the 
feedback sheet provided. Some examples were provided (e.g. former address, known 
other or random generation) 
 
Last, participants were asked to write down their current home address (or the address 
which they considered home).6 This afforded the writer scrutiny of an individual’s false 
address, identified thought processes and real address. The purpose of which was to 
establish some level of authenticity of participant answers. 
 
                                                 
6
 This was because as students many lived in halls of residence but would still consider their family house 
to be ‘home’ 
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Results 
H1 - a significant percentage of people will find it difficult to fabricate an entire 
false address when put on the spot (i.e. spontaneously). 
 
Identifying thought processes 
 
Participants were asked to try and identify thought processes involved in the generation 
of their false address in order that common strategies might be identified. No gender or 
age bias was found. An overwhelming 82% (n=117) indicated they felt they could  
identify the thought processes which had led them to generate the specific false address, 
whereby, a content analysis was conducted to identify common thought processes 
identified. The categories presented  were generated separately by the writer and then a 
second-rater and then discussed by both, A suitable level of inter-rater agreement was 
achieved, calculated by dividing the number of agreements by number of agreements plus 
number of disagreements, producing an index of agreement of 78% (e.g. see Robson, 
1993).  Subsequently, thought processes identified by participants were placed into four 
agreed categories; old addresses, address of known other, mixed thought processes and a 
random generation (N=142). A brief description of each is provided.  
• Old address -  8% (N= 11) of participants gave a former address as their false 
address indicating that under time pressure they had relied upon top-down 
processing and not random address generation. 
• Address of known other - 21% (N=29) of participants gave the address of a 
known other as the false address. Further analysis of ‘known other’ identified that 
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a close friend or family member’s address had been given 75% of the time. The 
remaining 25% comprised ex-partners and old work addresses (curiously 
‘someone I hate’ received several votes)7. These findings support the premise that 
a significant number of participants were using top-down processing when trying 
to generate a false address (i.e. address information from memory).  
• The same postcode, a similar postcode, same address different house number and 
a previous postcode – Participants in this category did not produce a ‘full’ old or 
address of known other as those in the previous two categories. However, 16% 
(N=23) of participants identified either the same postcode, a similar postcode, 
same address different house number and a previous postcode one of the above as 
a reason why they came up with the false postcode that they did.  
• Mixed/various thought processes - this category represented those who gave 
multi-layered explanations for arriving at the false address they did and 
constituted 35% (N=50) of thought processes identified. For example, some stated 
they chose the false door number because it was their favourite number and the 
street because it reminded them of a television character. Although, this may well 
have been the case, but it was just as likely that because they were asked to 
provide meaning for their action, they felt compelled to do so. As thought process 
identification was necessarily retrospective (i.e. after a false address had been 
generated) some may have succumbed to identifying meaning where it did not 
really exist; an effect of hindsight bias (e.g. see Khaneman, and Tversky, 1972, 
1973; Rossmo, 2009). This category, therefore, often reflected a reliance on prior 
                                                 
7
 Probably not a good tactic for anonymity if the feeling is reciprocated 
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knowledge only interpretable by the participant. It was not as obvious as a prior 
address or the address of known others. This category is more fully explored for 
‘psychological meaning’ later in this section along with ‘random’ processing. 
• Random - At face-value, 20% (N=29) of participants considered that their false 
address generation was a product of random processing, and so offered fewest 
clues as to the real address being concealed. Comparison of false addresses 
declared random by the participant with the corresponding real address provided 
did show some level of similarity. For example, in some cases, the false and real 
post codes began with the same letters (e.g. HD or LS). Again, this is more fully 
discussed in a later section.   
 
Although random and mixed thought process categories together represented some 55% 
of thought processes identified, any early pessimism was subdued when false postcodes 
were analysed in their own right. This leads to our second hypothesis. 
 
H2 - a significant percentage will, to differing degrees, give false details via a top-
down process, which will provide clues as to their place of residence. 
False post code analysis 
 
In total, 96% (n=136) of participants provided a false post code and 93% (n=132) gave a 
real one. As a result of the missing variables, there were only data for N=130 participants 
to analyse. 
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A first level of postcode analysis focused on whether participants had generated false 
postcodes located in the same postal area as their real postcode. It was agreed with a 
fellow rater that if a participant’s false and real postcodes began with the same pre-fix of 
letters (e.g. HD, NW, LS) this was to be considered the same postal area. The results are 
shown in Table 1 below. 
                                             Insert Table 1 about here 
 
As can be seen, 58% of false postcodes generated by participants were of the same town 
with 2% exactly the same as their real postcodes. This suggests, at face-value at least, 
participants tended to rely on local knowledge. This is probably best explained by 
surmising, as prior research has shown, that employing existing, more readily available 
knowledge, is less effortful cognitively than going out on a limb with totally random 
generation(e.g. Khaneman and Tversky, 1972, 1973; Fiske and Taylor, 2008; Rossmo, 
2009). 
 
A second level of postcode analysis sought to establish whether participants generated 
false postcodes that actually existed. Put simply, whether they were modifying known 
postcodes or were gambling on random generation. A postcode was considered as  
‘existing’ when it appeared in the UK Post Office list for 2007. Table 2 displays the 
percentage of participants who gave false postcodes that existed (i.e. were listed in the 
Post Office postcode list) and those that gave false postcodes that did not exist on the list. 
As can be seen, 68% of false post codes generated were found not to exist (whereby only 
10% of real postcodes given did not). 
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                                                Insert Table 2 about here 
 
A next level of analysis was focused on whether false existing postcodes (hereafter FEP 
i.e. listed on the Post Office list 2007) were the product of accurate random generation, 
pure luck, or based on existing post code knowledge (e.g. postcode from a previous 
address). A comparison of thought processes identified by the FEP group (N=46) with 
the ‘non- FEP’ remainder of the sample (i.e. thought processes identified by the sample 
less those able to generate an FEP). It was found that only 11% (N=5) of the FEP group 
stated they had randomly generated a false postcode, which was virtually half that of the 
remainder of the sample (21%, N=20) .Table 3 provides a comparison of the FEP 
participants and the thought processes they identified with the remainder of the cohort 
(participants). 
                                                  
                                                   Insert Table 3 about here  
 
The categorisation process for false postcodes displayed in Table 3 mirrors that used 
previously for whole addresses. ‘Same postcode’ refers to those who gave the same false 
as real post codes, ‘similar post code’ is where the pre-fix of the false post code is the 
same as the real postcode (e.g. LS or HD), and ‘Mixed’ refers to a variety of thought 
processes identified (e.g. HD1 is the beginning of an old friends post code and 5LX is the 
end of an old post code). Random is self-explanatory.   
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As can be seen from Table 3, the FEP group used old addresses, those of known others, 
and similar postcodes more and mixed and random less than the remainder of the sample. 
The full implication of this finding shall be discussed later. It suffices here to say that 
those individuals who provided a false postcode which was found to be an existing one, 
tended to use postcodes already well known to them.  
 
Lastly, calculations were carried out to discern the distance between an individual’s false 
existing postcode (FEP) and their real postcode (REP). This was to explore geo-spatial 
knowledge being utilised in the generation of false addresses and post codes. This was 
only possible where both false and real existent postcodes were given (i.e. FEP-
REP=distance between). In total, 44 participants gave false and real existing postcodes 
suitable for distance analysis. The median distance between false and real existing 
postcode was 3.6.km (range= 0-312.6km and standard deviation 77.12km). Where 27 
participants gave an FEP from the same town (as their REP) the mean distance between 
them was half that at 1.8.km (range= 0-12.7km and standard deviation 2.9km).  
Somewhat unsurprisingly, for the remaining 15 participants that gave an FEP for a 
different postal area, the mean distance between was found to be much greater at 55.6.km 
(range= 8.5-312.6km, standard deviation 106km). It was found, however, that these FEPs 
were based more on those of known others, than FEPs from the same town were (26% 
and 16% respectively). This highlighted, that when a distant FEP was given it was more 
likely to be based on specific pre-existing knowledge, such as the postcode of a known 
other (e.g. a close friend), rather than on knowledge of the area itself.  
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Discussion 
 
The present study indicates that when generating a false address people do tend to rely 
(albeit somewhat unwittingly) on pre-existing address knowledge usually pertaining to 
significant others and former residencies, rather than random generation. A vast majority 
of participants in the present study were able to generate what they thought to be a false 
address, but on reflection less than 20% stated that they thought this was totally random. 
45% later stating that the false address generated reflected identifiable elements (i.e. 
based on real information pertinent to them). In other words, they provided clues as to the 
real address trying to be concealed. This supports our hypotheses about likely cognitive 
processing (i.e. a reliance on top-down) and has practical implications for identifying and 
tracing putative offenders.  
 
The finding that people have difficulty in generating a false post code is perhaps of most 
practical significance. The findings from this study echo similar findings from cognitive 
psychology that people tend to defer to prior knowledge (e.g. heuristics) when faced with 
novel situations (e.g. Khaneman and Tversky, 1972, 1973; Rossmo, 2009).When asking 
suspects for personal details, officers would be advised to pay particular attention to the 
difficulty an individual might demonstrate in providing a postcode, as the cognitive 
processing involved in generating the necessary string of letters and numbers appears to 
fluster some people and they fail to produce a feasible false postcode. The finding that a 
significant percentage of participants rely on pre-existing post code knowledge to 
generate a false one, suggests strongly that post codes be made the principal focus of 
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those charged with detecting and tracing false detail givers. The finding that two- thirds 
of participants failed to generate a false postcode that actually existed (listed by the Post 
Office) emphasises this.  
 
With regard to those who successfully gave a false existing postcode, most relied on the 
postcode of a known other or that of an old or similar address. Calculations of distance 
between false and real postcode suggest that people rely heavily on local knowledge, 
electing for postcodes within their own postal area. A caveat to this finding is that 
although in some instances distances between postcodes (e.g. LS2 and LS5) might appear 
be relatively small, this may encompass numerous streets, roads, houses etc. making 
tracing a putative offender difficult.  
 
Further Research 
 
The present study of false address giving must be seen as merely a start, but an 
appropriate platform on which to build. The findings are limited by both participant 
numbers and composition. Research with a control group and a group of offenders may 
provide an interesting insight into whether offenders are more adept at providing credible 
false addresses than their non-offending counterparts. It must not be assumed that all 
offenders are ‘good’ liars, some will be and some won’t, in the same way that some 
professions will attract more able deceivers than others (e.g. salespeople see DePaulo and 
Depaulo, 1989). 
 
Participants in the present study were asked to write down a false address for practical 
reasons. Mainly so many more could participate than if the author interviewed one person 
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at a time. Whether the different modality (writing it down) had a significant effect is not 
known, but as participants were only given ten seconds to provide a false address the 
anticipation is that the same outcome would have been achieved if they had verbalised 
instead. Further research, however, should focus on whether the modality chosen plays a 
significant part in the generation of false details.  
 
The writer is realistic about any broad conclusions drawn from the present study. As most 
participants were psychology and criminology students, they may have felt more of an 
obligation to identify and understand their own thought processes than students of other 
disciplines might, therefore reading more into their false address than was perhaps there.  
 
Conversely, a charge can be made that participants in this study had no real incentive to 
deceive (e.g. no guilty or criminal mindset) as it was scenario based and not a real-life 
situation. Maybe, therefore, a true account of false address generation was not produced. 
Such consideration aside, most participants identified their false address to be ‘reality 
based’, the product of personal knowledge (e.g. top-down processing). As such, they 
failed to fabricate a completely random false address, affording some generalisability to 
real false detail situations. 
 
With further regard to the ecological validity of the present study, although participants 
were given just ten seconds to construct a complete false address (arguably shorter than 
one might get if stopped by a police officer) one presumes the scenario was not as anxiety 
inducing as the real thing, and so, although short in time, clarity of thinking was probably 
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greater than in a real false detail giving situation and in this respect the hypothesis is 
supported. Future research might benefit from a real time observation of people stopped 
by police and asked for their home address. With the aim of both identifying those giving 
a false address at the time and retrospectively tracing those found to have done so.  
 
In conclusion, the present study represents a first attempt to understand how false 
addresses are cognitively generated, and in turn, how the nature of that generation often 
leads the individual to give away clues to the address trying to be concealed. Humble 
beginnings maybe, but sufficient too inspire further research in this area. Research which 
holds not just theoretical and conceptual implications, but also serious practical ones for 
the identification and tracing of those that give false details to police and other agencies.   
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Table 1. A comparison of false and real post codes given according to postal area 
 
False post code pre-fix % of false postcodes 
Same town 58% (n=75) 
Different town 40% (n=53) 
Exactly the same postcode 2% (n=2) 
Total 100% (n=142) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. False existing, false non-existing and real participant postcodes  
 
 Exists Does not exist Total 
False postcode 32% (n=46) 68% (n=96) 100% (n=142) 
Real postcode 89% (n=127) 11% (n=15) 100% (n=142) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. A comparison of the false address thought processes identified by those 
who generated a false existing post code and those who did not 
 
Thought process identified % of FEP participants % of remainder of cohort 
Random           11% (n=5)               21% (n=20) 
Old address           15% (n=7)                 8%  (n=8) 
Known other           30% (n=14)               20% (n=19) 
Mixed           22% (n=10)               36% (n=35) 
Same postcode             7% (n=3)                 3% (n=3) 
Similar postcode            15% (n=7)               12% (n=11) 
Total           100% (n=46)               100% (n=96) 
 
